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Abstract 
The attribution of personal traits to others depends on the actions the observer performs at the 
same time (Bach & Tipper, 2007). Here, we show that the effect reflects a misattribution of 
appraisals of the observers’ own actions to the actions of others. We exploited spatial 
compatibility effects to manipulate how fluently – how fast and how accurately – participants 
identified two individuals performing sporty or academic actions. The traits attributed to each 
person in a subsequent rating task depended on the fluency of participants’ responses in a 
specific manner. An individual more fluently identified while performing the academic action 
appeared more academic and less sporty. An individual more fluently identified while 
performing the sporty action appeared sportier. Thus, social perception is – at least partially – 
embodied. The ease of our own responses can be misattributed to the actions of others, 
affecting which personal traits are attributed to them.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: 
Social perception, trait attribution, fluency, embodiment, cingulate cortex, action observation
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Your own actions influence how you perceive other people:  
a misattribution of action appraisals. 
 
Humans constantly attribute personal traits to others. One person may appear intellectual, but 
not interested in sports, whereas another person may appear more interested in sporting 
pursuits than intellectual challenges. These attribution processes are quick and automatic 
(Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992, McNeill & Burton, 2002; Bodenhaus & Macrae, 1998) and rely 
mostly on salient characteristics of the observed individuals: a person may be tall, strong, and 
fast; he may play for the college football team but is rarely seen in the library.  
Recently, however, researchers have begun to argue that social perception was not 
only based on readily apparent third-person information, but also on a process of 
‘simulation’. Accordingly, people covertly imitate the bodily states of others (Prinz, 1997; 
Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). These embodied person 
representations could then be used to attribute intentions, emotions and personal traits to the 
persons observed. This is possible because people have intimate knowledge about the specific 
internal states that would generate the bodily states in themselves (e.g. Barsalou, 2003; for a 
critical evaluation see Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005).  
There is ample evidence that covert imitation takes place in social interactions. 
Humans non-consciously and non-strategically mimic the people they interact with (e.g. 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Van Baaren, et al., 2004; for a review, see Niedenthal, Barsalou, 
Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). Similarly, it is known that observed actions prime 
similar actions in the observer, even when task irrelevant (e.g. Bach, Peatfield & Tipper, 
2007; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000). Analogous results come from 
neuroimaging techniques. So-called ‘mirror neurons’ have been discovered in the macaque 
premotor cortex (di Pellegrino, et al., 1992; Gallese, et al., 1996) that fire both when the 
monkey performs a particular action and when it observes the action being performed by a 
conspecific. These findings provided a neuronal foundation of the mimicry effects because 
they reveal how viewed actions can be matched directly to the actions an observer can 
produce (for similar data in humans, see Grèzes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; 
Iacoboni, Woods, Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti, 1999).  
In recent years, however, it has become clear that embodiment effects are not 
restricted to the representation of the particular motor acts others perform but also involve 
their attentional, somatosensory and affective responses. Observers seem to mimic, for 
instance, other persons’ gaze shifts (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, in press), the emotional 
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consequences of others’ pain (Morrison, et al., 2004), and even high-level action control 
processes evoked by the errors others make (Schuch & Tipper, 2007, van Schie, et al., 2004). 
Even though there is now ample evidence for automatic covert mimicry processes, it 
remains unknown whether these processes can form the basis of person judgments. A critical 
test would be to investigate whether changes in the bodily states of the observer can give rise 
to changes in how other people are perceived. There are studies that demonstrate the 
‘projection’ (Freud, 1915, 1953) of an observer’s traits onto others. For instance, Kawada, 
Oettingen, Gollwitzer, & Bargh (2004) showed that traits such as competitiveness and belief 
in malleable intelligence can become transferred from self to others, even when only held 
implicitly. However, even though these studies demonstrate that traits of an observer can 
become misattributed to other persons, they say nothing about whether such misattributions 
can be evoked directly by an observer’s bodily experiences, as would be predicted if 
judgments of others were based on a covert imitation of their bodily states.  
Recently, we have provided evidence for a very specific effect of action on social 
perception (Bach & Tipper, 2007). We asked participants to identify two actors – ‘George’ 
and ‘John’ – by responding with either their finger or their foot. Both actors were shown 
engaging in the sporty action of kicking a soccer ball and the academic action of typing on a 
computer keyboard. Thus, depending on whether an actor had to be identified with the finger 
or the foot, participants’ responses were either similar to the actor’s sporty action and 
dissimilar to his academic action, or vice versa. We investigated whether this similarity 
affected how ‘sporty’ and how ‘academic’ the two actors were subsequently perceived to be.  
The results of the identification task replicated previous research on imitative 
behavior as reviewed above, showing that responses were faster and more accurate when they 
were similar to the observed action. Interestingly, the fluency of participants’ responses also 
affected how ‘sporty’ and how ‘academic’ the two actors were perceived to be. An actor 
identified with a finger response was not only identified more quickly and accurately while 
performing the academic action of typing on a keyboard than the sporty action of kicking the 
soccer ball, he was subsequently judged to be more academic and less sporty. In contrast, an 
actor identified by a foot response was identified more fluently when kicking a soccer ball 
than when typing on a keyboard. He was later perceived to be sportier and less academic.  
The finding that our actions affect the personal traits we attribute to other people 
demonstrates that social judgments rely on representations in our own action system. 
However, it is unresolved on which level these effects occur. There are two possibilities:  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Tipper & Bach Report 5 
First, effects may only emerge during the representation of specific motor acts (e.g., 
kicking and typing actions). If self-produced and observed motor acts activate overlapping 
representations, any representation of an observed action should be enhanced if the observer 
performs a similar action, and disrupted if she/he performs a different action (e.g., Barsalou, 
et al., 2003). Such effects have been observed before (for a review, see Niedenthal, et al., 
2005). For instance, people found a message more agreeable if they nodded their heads while 
receiving it than when they shook their heads (Wells & Petty, 1980), and inducing smiles or 
frowns affected how funny participants rated cartoons they saw at the same time (Strack, 
Martin, Stepper, 1988). In a similar fashion, identifying an individual with a finger response 
would, on the one hand, interfere with the representation of the (dissimilar) kicking action 
and make him appear less sporty. On the other hand, the same finger response would enhance 
the representation of his (similar) typing action so that the individual appears more academic. 
This motor act hypothesis predicts that the effects on personal trait judgments emerged 
because there were different amounts of similarity between the sporty and academic actions 
participants saw and the responses they made at the same time. 
Humans do, however, represent actions not only in terms of the specific motor acts, 
but also evaluate actions in terms of outcomes: whether they can be performed fluently, or 
whether they are associated with increased effort, pain or errors (for a review, see Botvinick, 
Cohen, & Carter, 2004). Our personal-trait judgment effects might therefore also reflect that 
participants misattributed such appraisals of their own responses to the actions of the 
individuals. Recall that the similarity of the self-produced and observed action was associated 
with fewer errors and a faster speed of the participants’ identification responses. An actor 
identified with a foot response might therefore have appeared sportier because he was 
identified more fluently when he was seen in the sporty situation than when he was seen in 
the academic situation. Conversely, the other actor might have appeared more academic 
because he was identified with a finger response more fluently when seen in the academic 
situation. This view predicts that the similarity of one’s own responses and observed actions 
is not critical. Rather, it is important that the participants’ responses differ in degree of 
fluency when actors are seen performing the sporty and academic actions.  
To test whether changes in response fluency suffice to induce changes in personal trait 
judgments we adapted our original paradigm (Bach & Tipper, 2007). We kept the similarity 
of observed and self-produced actions constant, and induced changes in response fluency by 
exploiting spatial compatibility effects. In these spatial compatibility effects responses are 
faster and more accurate when they occur on the same side as the eliciting stimulus (Simon, 
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Craft, & Small, 1971; Simon & Rudell, 1967). If the personal trait judgment effects are due to 
the ease of participants’ responses being misattributed to the observed actions then they 
should also occur in the present experiment. If, however, the personal trait effects require 
overlapping representations of observed and self-produced motor acts, effects on personality 
judgments should not be observed.  
 
  
Experiment 
In the experiment, participants made left and right finger key presses to identify two actors 
(George and John) that were presented either kicking a soccer ball or typing on a keyboard. 
To do this, the participants had to orient visual attention to the faces of the actors. Presenting 
this critical stimulus feature either to the left or right side of the screen allowed us to 
manipulate its spatial compatibility with the left or right keys used to identify the actors, 
thereby inducing changes in response fluency (the Simon effect; Simon, et al., 1971; Simon 
& Rudell, 1967), without affecting the similarity between observed actions and the 
participants’ responses. 
Assume, for instance, that for a given participant both actors are always presented on 
the right when performing the sporty action and on the left when performing the academic 
action (see Figure 1). This creates a situation in which the response to identify one of the two 
actors (e.g. the right key press to identify John) will be spatially compatible, and hence faster 
and more accurate, when he is seen in the sporty context and incompatible, and hence slower 
and less accurate, when seen in the academic context. Of course the opposite pattern should 
be observed for the left key-presses to identify George. 
 
--- insert Figure 1 about here --- 
 
The critical question is whether induced differences in response fluency will translate into 
differences in personal trait judgments. If the effects on personal trait judgments are due to a 
misattribution of action appraisals, then the actors should take on the traits associated with 
the situation in which they are most fluently identified. In the above example, an actor should 
appear more academic when he is identified with a left key because this response is spatially 
compatible with the location of his face in the academic scenes (‘George’ in Figure 1). An 
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actor should appear sportier when he is identified with a right key because the right key is 
spatially compatible with his position in the sporty scenes (‘John’ in Figure 1).  
Note that any changes in personal trait judgments induced in this way cannot be 
attributed to a similarity between observed actions and self produced responses. Each actor 
(George or John) is associated with a finger key press response, as is each action (sporty & 
academic).1 Thus, if effects on personal trait judgments require that self-produced and 
observed actions converge on the same representations (as assumed by the motor act 
hypothesis) then no such effects would be expected in the present experiment.  
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two students (27 females) ranging in age from 18 to 42 years participated 
in the study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The key assignment 
of actors (George/John) to response keys (left/right) was counterbalanced across participants, 
as was the side on which the persons appeared in the scenes (left in the sporty scenes and 
right in the academic scenes, or vice versa). Thus, for one half of the participants, John was 
identified with a compatible response when typing and George when kicking, and vice versa 
for the other half of participants. Participants satisfied all requirements in volunteer screening 
and gave informed consent approved by the School of Psychology at the University of Wales, 
Bangor and the North-West Wales Health Trust, and in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki.  
Material and Apparatus. Participants were seated in a dimly lit room facing a color monitor 
at a distance of 60 cm. The experiment was controlled by Presentation run on a 3.0 GHz PC 
running Windows XP. The stimulus set was identical to Experiment 1 of Bach and Tipper 
(2007). It consisted of eight movies (see Figure 1 for examples) lasting 1100 ms each and 
subtending eight degrees visual angle vertically and eleven degrees horizontally. Two of 
these movies showed John or George kicking a soccer ball, and two movies showed John or 
George pressing a key on a computer keyboard. In these four movies, the head of each actor 
appeared on the left side of the frame centre (eccentricities: kicking: 1.1 degrees; typing: 1.9 
degrees). For each of these movies a mirror-inverted version was created, in which the actor’s 
face appeared on the right.  
Procedure and Design. After the computer-driven instructions and a short training phase of 
16 trials the experiment began. It lasted for about 15 minutes and consisted of 320 trials. Each 
participant saw four of the eight movies, which were presented at equal rates in a randomized 
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order. Movies were selected in the following way. For one participant, the two actors were 
presented on the right while kicking and on the left while typing. For another participant, the 
sides of presentation were reversed between typing and kicking actions. This ensured that for 
each participant, a right key-press to identify actor one was spatially compatible with only 
one of the two situations in which he appeared (e.g., the sporty situation of kicking a football) 
and spatially incompatible with the other situation (e.g., the academic situation of typing). 
Conversely, the left key-press to identify actor two was spatially compatible with the 
academic situation but not the sporty situation. 
Participants initiated each trial by pressing the space bar with their left hand. After 
500 ms the movie was presented. Participants identified John or George by pressing either the 
/ or \ keys on the computer keyboard with their left or right index finger. Participants were 
instructed to identify the individual during the interval in which the movie played (1100 ms). 
If their identification was correct, the next trial was allowed to start. If participants were too 
slow or committed an error an error-message was displayed.  
After the experiment was finished, a short questionnaire consisting of four questions 
was presented on the computer screen. Participants were presented with the name and face 
image of one actor and asked to indicate on a scale from –4 (‘not at all’) to 4 (‘very much”) 
how sporty they imagined him to be. The also rated the degree to which they thought him 
academic. They answered the same two questions with regard to the second actor. The order 
in which actors and traits were rated was counterbalanced across participants.  
 
Results 
Vision-action fluency. RTs were entered into a repeated measures ANOVAs with the within-
subjects factors Observed Action (sporty/academic) and Person (John/George) and the 
between-subjects factor Compatibility (whether John is spatially compatible when typing and 
John when kicking, or vice versa). Trials in which participants were too slow or in which they 
pressed a wrong button were excluded (4%). The analysis revealed main effects of Person 
(F[1,30] = 9.3, p < .005) and Observed Action (F[1,30] = 24.1, p < .0001). John was 
generally identified faster than George, and the persons were generally identified faster in the 
academic scenes, in which the faces were larger/clearer. Most importantly, the predicted 
three-way interaction of Person, Observed Action and Compatibility was highly significant 
(F[1,30] = 21.3, p < .0001). Thus, the RTs to identify the two persons in the two situations 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Tipper & Bach Report 9 
depended on which person was identified with a spatially compatible response while typing, 
and which person was identified with a compatible response while kicking.  
We further investigated whether this dependency on compatible responses was present 
for both the sporty and academic situations. A two-way ANOVA with the within-subjects 
factors Person (John, George) and the between-subjects factor Compatibility (whether John 
or George is compatible while typing) computed for the RTs in the academic scenes indeed 
revealed the critical two-way interaction of Person and Compatibility (F[1,30] = 9.8, p = 
.004), with responses being generally faster for the person identified with a compatible 
response while typing. The reverse result was obtained for the analogous analysis of the 
sporty scenes (F[1,30] = 13.0, p = .001), with faster responses for the person identified with a 
compatible response while kicking. See Table 1 for the RT data in all conditions, and Figure 
2, top panel, for the data collapsed across George and John. 
Error rates were analyzed with the same ANOVA model. There was a main effect for 
Observed Action (F[1,30] = 8.4, p = .007), that was further qualified by an interaction of 
Observed Action and Person (F[1,30] = 7.2, p = .011). The persons were more easily 
identified in the academic scenes than the sporty scenes, and this advantage was particularly 
found for the identification of George. The critical three-way interaction of Observed Action, 
Person, and Compatibility was again significant (F[1,30] = 18.8, p = .0001). Again, the 
dependency on spatial compatibility was present for both sporty (F[1,30] = 9.1, p = .005) and 
academic scenes (F[1,30] = 6.0, p = .021). Thus, in both scenes, the participants made fewer 
errors when identifying the person for which response side and head location were 
compatible (see Figure 2, middle panel, and Table 1).  
--- insert Figure 2 and Table 1 about here --- 
Personal-trait judgments. As in the RTs and Error rates, the rating data were entered into a 
repeated measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factors Trait (sporty/academic) and 
Person (John/George) and the between-subjects factor Compatibility (whether John is 
spatially compatible when typing and George when kicking, or vice versa). The results 
mirrored the original study (Bach & Tipper, 2007). Main effects of Trait (F[1,30] = 21.0, p < 
.0001) and Person (F[1,30] = 25.6, p < .0001) reflected that overall, the persons were judged 
more academic than sporty, and that John received higher ratings than George. There was 
also a Person by Trait interaction (F[1,30] = 46.8, p < .0001) indicating that the two persons 
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were rated differently on the two traits: John was judged sportier than George (p < .0001), but 
George appeared more academic (p < .0005). 
Most importantly, as in the RTs and Error Rates, there was a three-way interaction of 
Person, Action, and Compatibility (F[1,30]  = 6.8, p < .014). Thus, the attribution of personal 
traits to the two persons depended on which person was identified with a spatially compatible 
response while typing, and which person was identified with a compatible response while 
kicking. Two-way ANOVAs showed again that this dependency on compatible responses 
was present for both academic (F[1,30]  = 4.4, p = .044) and sporty judgments (F[1,30]  = 
6.4, p = .017). Although George was generally seen to be more academic than John, this 
difference was reduced when John was identified with a compatible response while typing. 
Conversely, although John was generally perceived sportier than George, this difference was 
reduced when George was identified with a compatible response while kicking. Figure 2, 
lower panel, shows the rating data collapsed across John and George, and Table 1 shows the 
data in all conditions. 
Mediational analysis. As a last step of our analysis, we performed a mediation analysis to 
investigate whether our spatial compatibility manipulation affected trait judgment directly or 
by inducing changes in response fluency during person identification. To this end, we derived 
single measures for (a) the spatial compatibility manipulation, (b) the resulting compatibility 
effects in the RTs and Error rates, and (c) the compatibility effects in the personal trait 
judgments. The measure for the spatial compatibility manipulation was derived by setting the 
value to 1 for the participants for whom George was compatible when typing and John when 
kicking, and to -1 for the participants with the reverse assignment. The measure for the 
compatibility effects in RTs, Error rates and trait judgments were calculated by subtracting 
the mean of the sporty John and academic George responses from the mean of academic John 
and sporty George responses. The first group of participants should therefore show positive 
compatibility effects, whereas the second group should show negative effects. 
Correlational analyses revealed first that, as shown in the main analysis, spatial 
compatibility was correlated with trait judgments effects (r = .43, p = .014) and with the 
fluency effects in the identification task (RTs, r = .64, p < .001; Errors, r = .62, p < .001). 
Consistent with our mediational hypothesis, the fluency effects in the identification task were 
in turn positively correlated with subsequent trait judgment effects, though this relationship 
was only significant for the Error rates (r = .45, p = .01) but not for the RTs (r = .22, p = .23).  
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The critical test for mediation is whether controlling for the effects of the mediator 
variables (i.e. the fluency effects) significantly reduces the relationship between spatial 
compatibility and trait judgments (i.e., the Sobel test; Sobel, 1982; for a review see Preacher 
& Hayes, 2004). The data were therefore entered into a multiple mediator regression analysis 
(for details, see Preacher & Hayes, in review) that uses the fluency effects in both RTs and 
Error Rates as potential mediator variables, so that the unique effect of each variable could be 
captured while the other variable was controlled (e.g., Preacher & Hayes, in review; Shrout & 
Bolger, 2004). This analysis indeed revealed a marginally significant mediation effect for the 
fluency effect in the Error Rates (z = 1.9; p < .07), but not for the effect in RTs (z = -1.4; p = 
.17). Thus, the mediational analysis confirms that our spatial compatibility manipulation 
affected trait judgments not directly, but at least partially by inducing fluency effects in the 
error rates during person identification. 
 
Discussion 
The present study replicated the vision-action personality effect demonstrated by Bach and 
Tipper (2007). As in the previous study, the actions of the observer influenced which 
personal traits she attributed to individuals she watched at the same time. As such, social 
perception appears to be at least partially grounded in the system that we use to perform and 
to represent the outcomes of our own actions (Niedenthal, et al., 2005; Bach & Tipper, 2007).  
Our new results also provide insights into the level of action representation at which 
the effects occurred. They point towards a misattribution of high-level appraisals of one’s 
own actions to the actions of others. We manipulated the fluency of the participants’ 
responses by varying the spatial compatibility of the response keys (left/right) and the 
position of the actor’s face in the scenes (left/right). These variations in response fluency 
were sufficient to influence personal trait judgments. Actors were judged sportier when they 
were identified more fluently while performing the sporty action. They were judged more 
academic when they were more fluently identified while performing the academic action.  
The critical role of fluency in affecting personal trait judgments was further confirmed 
by a mediational analysis. It showed that our spatial compatibility manipulation did not 
influence subsequent personal trait judgments directly, but specifically because it evoked 
changes in the fluency of the responses. As in the previous study (Bach & Tipper, 2007), this 
relationship between fluent responses and subsequent trait judgment effects was specifically 
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found for the error rates, for which fluency changes were very salient due to error feedback, 
but not for the more subtle changes in response speed. 
These observations are not consistent with our prior assumption (Bach & Tipper, 
2007). We had assumed that the judgment effects occurred because observed and self-
produced motor acts converged on the same representations in the so-called ‘mirror’ areas of 
the brain. One person might, for instance, have appeared sportier because the representation 
of his kicking action was enhanced if the observer performed a (similar) foot action, and 
disrupted if he performed a (dissimilar) hand action. Although such a process could take 
place, it cannot explain the present results. Personal trait judgment effects were evoked even 
though there was no differential amount of similarly between the participants’ left and right 
responses and the sporty and academic actions. Our new results therefore indicate that the 
effects occurred on a higher level of action representation, reflecting a misattribution of 
appraisals of the observer’s own actions to the actions of others. In particular, they indicate 
that fluency appraisals of the observer’s own actions might become misattributed to the 
actions of others and affect how they are perceived.  
Similar effects of fluency on judgments have been observed before. A robust finding 
is that stimuli that are more fluently identified also appear more aesthetically pleasing (for a 
review, see Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004). However, our results go beyond these 
findings in several respects. First, whereas in previous studies fluency was a consequence of 
the perceptual properties of the viewed stimuli such as contrast or presentation time, it was 
now manipulated by affecting the overt motor behavior of the participants (i.e. the speed and 
accuracy of their identification responses). Second, previously observed changes in attitude to 
objects were typically very general, affecting global attributes such as liking or beauty. In 
contrast, the present manipulation induced specific changes in attitude and enhanced certain 
traits of the observed persons but not others (i.e. a person appears more sporty but less 
academic, or vice versa). And third, to our knowledge, this is the first study that used a motor 
fluency manipulation to successfully induce changes in the attitude towards other people, as 
opposed to abstract stimuli or objects. 
Our new findings may serve to link current ideas from social psychology to research 
on clinical populations. A failure to differentiate self from other is increasingly recognized as 
a hallmark of various clinical syndromes. For instance, autistic individuals exhibit a number 
of behaviors that suggest a failure to distinguish self and other, such as echolalia and 
echopraxia, difficulties in theory of mind tasks, and the confusion of the pronouns “I” and 
“You” (cf. Russell & Jarrold, 1999; Rogers & Pennington, 1991). Similarly, in schizophrenia 
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the inner speech of the sufferers might become misattributed to other, often malevolent, 
individuals (cf. Frith, Rees, & Friston, 1998). Our study shows that such misattributions are 
not restricted to clinical populations but also take place in the general population, though of 
course to a less extreme extent. 
The differences between our study and previous reports of fluency affecting stimulus 
judgments also raise the question about which mechanism drives the effect, and about exactly 
what becomes misattributed. Prior research on fluency suggests that the effects occur on the 
level of affective responses (for a review, see Reber et al., 2004). For instance, Monahan, 
Murphy and Zajonc (2000) showed that presenting stimuli repeatedly leads to a general 
enhancement of positive affect that, in turn, can affect the judgment of even unrelated stimuli. 
Similarly, the fluent identification of one individual (e.g., John) in one of the situations (e.g., 
sporty) might have evoked positive affective responses, which in turn influenced how the 
individuals were perceived. It could therefore be that affective responses are at the core of a 
general mechanism that affects appraisal processes, influencing judgments of one’s own 
actions, the actions of others, and even of non-animate objects in the environment. 
A second possibility is that the personal trait judgment effects reflect the 
misattribution of the fluency experiences themselves, regardless of affective consequences of 
the fluent responses. This idea relies on the assumption that people constantly evaluate their 
own actions and that these evaluations can ‘spill over’ to the actions of others, thereby 
affecting trait attributions based on these actions. Judgment effects that originate from 
evaluations of the observer’s own actions are not unknown in social psychology. Higgins has 
introduced the notion of ‘value from fit’ (e.g., Higgins, 2000). If an action is appropriate to an 
internal state, this creates a feeling of ‘rightness’ that can transfer to unrelated stimuli and 
make them appear more valuable. Interestingly, this effect has been shown to be independent 
of mediating affective factors (Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Speigel and Molden, 2003). We 
propose the fluency experiences evoked by spatially compatible responses might similarly be 
transferred to the observed individuals and let their actions appear more fluent.  
Recent findings from neuroimaging studies are consistent with such a view. Areas in 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) have been shown to evaluate the outcome of actions with 
regard to effort, pain, errors, or the presence of response conflict (for a review, see Botvinick, 
et al., 2004). Intriguingly, it has recently become clear that the ACC has mirror properties, 
that is, it represents these properties for own and others’ actions alike (Morrison, Lloyd, Di 
Pellegrino, & Roberts, 2004; van Schie, Mars, Coles, & Bekkering, 2004; Schuch & Tipper, 
in press). This overlap in the neuronal representations of the evaluation of one’s own and 
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other’s actions, such as effort, errors or conflict, is different from the specific motor processes 
simulated when observing another’s action, such as whether a hand or foot is used, assumed 
by the mirror neuron theorists.  
 
Conclusions 
Humans attribute personal traits to others on the basis of action representations that code for 
both the observer’s own actions and the actions of others. However, the critical overlap 
between self and other did not exist on the level of the specific motor acts that were 
performed. Rather, the present results indicate that the outcomes or appraisals of one’s own 
actions were misattributed to the actions of others. These findings are consistent with 
embodied accounts of social perception that do not restrict mirroring to the level of motor 
representations, but that assume that all aspects of another person’s state can be represented 
as if they were one’s own, including high level evaluative and affective responses. 
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Footnotes 
1. Note that the stimuli also contained actions towards the left or right that could, in 
principle, produce compatibility effects with the side of the response. However, to 
perform the identification task, participants had to orient their attention towards the 
faces of the actors. Since compatibility effects strongly depend on where attention is 
distributed on the display (e.g., Bach, Peatfield, & Tipper, 2007), the side of the 
actors’ head should determine compatibility effects to a stronger extent than the 
direction of the irrelevant action. Moreover, the direction of the action was always 
opposite to the side of the individuals’ heads in the displays. Action based 
compatibility should therefore, if anything, produce the opposite pattern of results (in 
RTs, Error rates, and ratings) as the spatial compatibility between head location and 
response keys. 
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Tables 
 
 George compatible when typing John compatible when typing 
 John compatible when kicking George compatible when kicking 
 sporty academic sporty academic 
 George John George John George John George John 
RTs (ms.) 600 564 563 573 573 576 568 547 
stdev 45 42 37 38 75 67 63 62 
         
Errors (%) 5,9% 2,9% 1,9% 4,4% 4,2% 5,2% 3,8% 3,4% 
stdev 4,4% 2,5% 1,6% 3,1% 4,5% 3,6% 3,5% 2,0% 
         
ratings -1,9 1,3 1,7 -0,1 -0,5 1,3 1,4 0,8 
stdev 1,0 1,1 0,6 1,1 1,4 1,2 1,3 1,2 
 
Table 1. Results of the Experiment in RTs, Error rates, and personal trait ratings for the two 
persons (George, John) and both scenes (academic, sporty), depending on whether George 
was always presented in a compatible manner while typing and John while kicking, or vice 
versa. Bold numbers indicate compatible responses. 
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. This figure shows the individuals to be identified, typical displays and the basic 
design. The dotted white vertical line is shown to depict the centre of the display for the 
reader. It was not present in the stimulus displays.  
Figure 2. Results. The upper two panels show the spatial compatibility effects for RTs (upper 
panel) and error rates (middle panel) in the identification task, collapsed across the two 
persons (John and George). The lower panel shows the results of the personal trait judgment 
task. Error bars show the standard error of the means. 
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